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Special Immigrant Juvenile Status: Special
Here, Special There, But Not Special
Everywhere
NATHAN PRICE†

INTRODUCTION
Ana Herrera was only four months old when she was abandoned
by both her mother and her father.1 Ana was left in the care of her
maternal grandmother and did not have any further contact with her
parents.2 Ana’s grandmother, try though she might, could not get a job
and, as a result, Ana often did not have enough food.3 For almost two
decades, Ana lived without guarantee of a daily meal, attempting to
help when she could by working here and there, and unable to attend
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1. Elizabeth Doerr, Young People Traveling Across the Border Alone Are Making it to
Maryland
–
and
Fighting
to
Stay,
CITY PAPER
(May
25,
2016),
http://www.citypaper.com/news/features/bcp-062516-feature-ana-profile-20160525story.html.
2. Id.
3. Id.
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school because of her poverty and the incessant local gang violence.4
One day, Ana was in her neighborhood and witnessed the murder
of her cousin.5 To make matters worse, the murderers knew she saw
them.6 Fearing for her life, Ana left her home country of El Salvador
alone and headed towards the United States, where her aunt lived.7
Four dangerous weeks and 2,000 miles later, traveling on foot and by
bus, Ana made it to the Texas border and crossed into the Land of the
Free.8 Ana was apprehended by Immigration Services and was sent to
a detention center.9 After weeks of incarceration, Ana was sent to her
aunt’s house in Maryland.10 Being over the age of eighteen, Ana was
on a deadline if she was to benefit from Special Immigrant Juvenile
Status (SIJS),11 which is meant to help foreign children who have been
abused, neglected, or abandoned find a better life in the United States.12
Ana’s aunt petitioned the local Circuit Court for guardianship of her
niece, as well as for specialized findings of fact13 required for SIJS: that
Ana had been abandoned, abused, or neglected by one or both of her
parents.14 The Circuit Court made the desired findings of fact and Ana
was ultimately granted SIJS and became a legal resident of the United
States.15
Ana was one of the lucky ones. While Maryland allowed Ana to
become dependent on a juvenile court through guardianship at
nineteen years of age, there are many juveniles that are not so
fortunate.16 SIJS is made available by a federal statute17 that allows
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Doerr, supra note 1.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2006)
(requiring that the juvenile be declared dependent on a juvenile court and that reunification
with one or both parents not be viable due to “abuse, neglect, [or] abandonment” in order to
qualify for SIJS); see also Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 1-201(a) (defining “child” as “an
unmarried individual under the age of 21 years”).
12. Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERV.,
https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/special-immigrant-juveniles/special-immigrant-juvenilessij-status (last visited Apr. 23, 2017).
13. Doerr, supra note 1.
14. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101.
15. Doerr, supra note 1.
16. Id.
17. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2006); see also 8
U.S.C. § 1232 (2008).
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immigrant juveniles who have been abused, abandoned, or neglected
by one or both parents to petition a state juvenile court for special
factual findings that will put the juvenile on an accelerated path to
citizenship.18 The juvenile must also be declared dependent on that
state juvenile court by that court, and must demonstrate that it is not in
his or her best interest to return to the country of origin.19 Some
children “age out” of SIJS eligibility while their SIJS applications are
pending,20 and still others are prohibited from becoming dependent on
a juvenile court once they are over the age of seventeen, depending on
the state law.21 This Comment discusses several states’22 different
approaches to applying SIJS, analyzes various problems found in those
approaches, as well as the lack of uniformity across the states, and
proposes several solutions to bridge the differences amongst the states
and transform SIJS into the universal safeguard it was meant to be by
ensuring a uniform, humanitarian application of SIJS.23
SIJS seekers begin in state court, where certain factual findings
must be made in order for them to proceed along the path of obtaining
SIJS.24 These factual findings must be made as part of a proceeding
that results in the SIJS seeker being adjudicated to be dependent on the
court.25 This presents a unique federalism issue, as noted by some
courts when addressing SIJS petitions.26 The issue of immigration
regulation, in which state courts are required to play a part under the
SIJS framework, has been unequivocally left to the federal government
for over a century.27 By requiring state courts to make findings of fact
that the Department of Homeland Security depends on when making
immigration determinations, the SIJS statute effectively delegates
certain aspects of immigration determination to state courts.28 As a
18. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101; see also Jessica R. Pulitzer, Note, Fear and Failing in Family
Court: Special Immigrant Juvenile Status and the State Court Problem, 21 CARDOZO J.L. &
GENDER 201, 213-14 (2014).
19. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101; see also Pulitzer, supra note 18.
20. See Perez-Olano v. Gonzales, 248 F.R.D. 248, 268-69 (C.D. Cal. 2008); see also 8
C.F.R. § 204.11 (setting the age restriction for application as “under twenty-one years of age”).
21. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01 (West 2016) (defining a minor under Florida law as “any
unmarried person under the age of 18 years” for purposes of child-related adjudications).
22. Maryland, Florida, and California.
23. See Pulitzer, supra note 18.
24. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2006).
25. Id.
26. See infra Part II.B.
27. Chae Chan Ping v. U.S., 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (“The power of exclusion of
foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belong[s] to the government of the United States”).
28. 8 U.S.C. § 1101.
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relatively new process, this has created challenges in the state courts,
some of which grapple with the propriety of their new-found
responsibility.29
The importance of uniformity in SIJS adjudications across the
fifty states, as well as safeguards against the rise of obstacles to SIJS
seekers created by state law, cannot be understated. The success of
otherwise identical SIJS petitions varies wildly from state to state.
Because of the undeniable injustices this lack of uniformity produces,
something must be done to ensure that petitions are treated equally,
regardless of which state they are brought in. Furthermore, the lack of
adequate safeguards in place to prevent procedural and substantive
obstacles from arising further obviates the fact that something must be
done to ensure that those that fall within the ambit and intent of the
SIJS statute are able to take advantage of its protections.
Part I of this Comment walks through the history of SIJS, from its
inception in 199030 to present day. Part II discusses how SIJS has been
applied in Maryland, Florida, and California through the discussion of
select cases. These states were chosen because they represent three
distinct ways in which state courts have addressed the SIJS issue.31 Part
III identifies problems state courts have faced dealing with SIJS
petitions and proposes solutions to those issues. Part III also proposes
ways to ensure uniformity across the nation regarding SIJS petition
adjudications and discusses nationwide solutions that could
revolutionize the way SIJS is applied and enable thousands more
immigrant children to profit from its protections. Lastly, Part III
presents a realistic, comprehensive solution that would solve or curtail
the issues discussed throughout the Comment.
PART I. THE HISTORY OF SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS 1990
TO 1997
Prior to 1990, there was no meaningful distinction in United
States immigration law between immigrant adults and immigrant
children.32 This was despite steps taken across the world during the late
twentieth century toward implementing a “best interest of the child”
29. See infra Part II.B.
30. Heryka Knoespel, Note, Special Immigrant Juvenile Status: a “Juvenile” Here is Not
a “Juvenile” There, 19 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 505, 507 (2013); see also 8
U.S.C. § 1101.
31. See infra Part II.
32. See Pulitzer, supra note 18, at 204.
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philosophy when making decisions regarding a child’s rights.33 The
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), in 1990, mandated that:
“[i]n all actions concerning children; whether undertaken by public or
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interest of the child shall be a
primary consideration.”34 However, the United States is one of three
signatory states to the CRC that has not ratified it.35 This means that,
while the United States cannot pass laws that conflict with this maxim
or any of the CRC’s provisions, the United States does not have to
positively pass or enforce legislation that will bring about the CRC’s
humanitarian goals.36
Instead of ratifying the CRC, the United States took its own steps
towards considering the best interests of the child in 1990 by signing
into law the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).37 The INA created
a new form of relief for immigrant children who fit certain criteria:
Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS).38 Under the INA, a child
seeking SIJS would have to obtain from a state court: (1) an order
declaring the child dependent on the court, (2) a finding that the child
was eligible for long-term foster care, and (3) a finding that it was not
in the child’s best interest to return to the child’s home country.39 In
1993, federal regulations were promulgated that defined eligibility for
long-term foster care as a situation where reunification with the child’s
parents was no longer possible.40 Specifically, the regulation defined a
child eligible for long-term foster care as one that would “normally be
expected to remain in foster care until reaching the age of majority,
unless the child is adopted or placed in a guardianship situation.”41 The
regulations were silent on what constituted dependency on a state
33. Id. at 208-09 (discussing the passage by the United Nations of the Declaration of the
Rights of the Child in 1959 and the subsequent Convention on the Rights of the Child passed
in 1989); Convention of the Rights of the Child, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 49, at 167, U.N.
Doc. A/44/49 (1989) [hereinafter CRC].
34. CRC, supra note 33; see also Pulitzer, supra note 18, at 209.
35. Pulitzer, supra note 18, at 209 n.54 (stating that the three countries that had not
ratified the CRC were: Somalia, South Sudan, and the United States).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 211; see also Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)
(2006).
38. 8 U.S.C. § 1101; Pulitzer, supra note 18, at 211.
39. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101; see also Theo Liebmann, Family Court and the Unique Needs
of Children and Families Who Lack Immigration Status, 40 SOLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 583,
589 (2007).
40. Pulitzer, supra note 18, at 211 n.73; see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 (2006).
41. Pulitzer, supra note 18, at 211 n.73
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court, as well as any indication as to the proper best interest factors,
making such determinations purely a matter of state law.42
Armed with the three factual determinations of the state court, the
SIJS applicant would then send the court documents and proper legal
forms to the local Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
District Office.43 The final step in the application was an interview with
INS, which reviewed and rendered a decision on the immigration
aspect of the application.44
A. 1997 to 2008
In 1997, Congress amended the requirements of SIJS, primarily
out of concern for fraud by juveniles using student visas.45 Congress
became concerned that these juveniles sought to become dependents
on a state court in order to gain legal status rather than to actually
escape abuse, abandonment, or neglect.46 For example, in 2003, the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit remarked that a large loophole
existed for any visiting student where the student could file a petition
with the appropriate state court requesting SIJS on the basis that he or
she qualified for foster care, with a substantial chance that the petition
would succeed based on the students’ separation from any potential
caregiver.47
The statute was amended to require not only that the child be
eligible for long-term foster care, but that the child be eligible for longterm foster care because of abuse, abandonment, or neglect.48 The
statute, as amended, also required any child already in custody of the
immigration authorities to seek the consent of the United States
Attorney General before beginning any kind of state court dependency
proceeding.49 This change was controversial because, prior to the
42. 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c) (requiring that dependency determinations be made “in
accordance with state law governing such declarations of dependence”); Pulitzer, supra note
18, at 211 n.73.
43. Pulitzer, supra note 18, at 211 n.74.
44. Id. at 211-12. For purposes of this Comment, this will be the final mention of the
latter portion of the application process because the procedure has remained substantially the
same since the inception of SIJS. In addition, the process is applied relatively uniformly across
the country and is not subject to the same problems discussed herein.
45. Pulitzer, supra note 18, at 212.
46. Id.
47. Yeboah v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 345 F.3d 216, 221 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Knoespel,
supra note 30, at 507.
48. Pulitzer, supra note 18, at 212.
49. Id.
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amendment, state courts had full jurisdiction over all immigrant
juveniles, regardless of the their detainment status.50 The change
limited the number of juveniles able to seek SIJS, prohibiting the many
juveniles who were already in the custody of the Department of
Homeland Security or Immigration and Customs Enforcement from
beginning the SIJS process.51
B. 2008 to Present
In 2008, Congress took dramatic steps toward rearming the SIJS
statute with the power it needed to protect the vulnerable, underage
immigrants for whom it was created. Congress passed the William
Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act
(TVPRA),52 which clarified the requirements a child needed to meet to
be eligible for SIJS, and greatly expanded the number of immigrant
children that were eligible.53 The TVPRA amended the SIJS eligibility
requirements so that, in order to qualify, a child needed to: (1) be
declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States or
be declared dependent on an individual or entity appointed by a State
or juvenile court, (2) obtain a finding from a juvenile court that the
minor is unable to reunify with one or both parents due to abuse,
neglect, or abandonment by the parent(s), and (3) obtain a finding from
a juvenile court that it would not be in the child’s best interest to return
to the child’s country of nationality or previous habitual residence.54
This was a substantial step towards achieving the goals set forth by the
CRC: that all adjudications regarding immigrant children have the
child’s best interest as the primary objective.55 With this amendment,
the child no longer needed to be eligible for long-term foster care and
now required a finding that at least one parent had abused, abandoned,
or neglected the child.56 The amendment also explicitly required that
the state court consider the best interest of the child when determining
the child’s eligibility for SIJS.57

50. Id.
51. Id.
52. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, 8
U.S.C. § 1232 (2008) [hereinafter TVPRA].
53. Pulitzer, supra note 18, at 213; see also Knoespel, supra note 30, at 509.
54. TVPRA, 8 U.S.C. § 1232 (2008); Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2006); see also Pulitzer, supra note 18, at 213; see also Knoespel, supra
note 30, at 510.
55. CRC, supra note 33; Pulitzer, supra note 18, at 209.
56. See TVPRA, 8 U.S.C. § 1232 (2008); 8 U.S.C. §1101; 8 C.F.R. § 204.11.
57. See TVPRA, 8 U.S.C. § 1232 (2008); 8 U.S.C. §1101; 8 C.F.R. § 204.11.
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The TVPRA also instituted limited “age-out” protections at the
federal level for children eligible for SIJS by requiring United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to consider the age of
the child at the time the child filed his or her petition for SIJS.58 This
prevented a common occurrence where otherwise eligible children
would pass the cut-off age of twenty-one while their applications were
passed from desk to desk or were lost, sometimes multiple times.59 The
amendment also required that the USCIS process a petition within 180
days of its receipt, dramatically decreasing the amount of time it would
take these petitions to receive a final adjudication.60
PART II. APPLICATION OF SIJS
This section describes and analyzes current SIJS case law in three
states: Maryland, Florida, and California. These states were chosen
because each one demonstrates some of the larger trends that have
emerged across the nation within state courts faced with SIJS petitions.
Maryland courts have at times failed to reach the SIJS issues because
of procedural and substantive obstacles that have arisen through
Maryland’s application of its Family Law Article and Maryland
common law precedent.61 Florida courts have taken issue with the role
they are now asked to play in immigration, a field they contend is a
purely federal concern.62 The California courts, in contrast, have
consistently addressed the SIJS issue, making SIJS findings of fact in
cases of juvenile delinquency and thereby demonstrating their
commitment to making said findings when presented.63 The analysis
focuses on the factors and definitions used by each state in the
adjudication of SIJS petitions. Multiple cases will be discussed and
analyzed to obtain a picture of the legal landscape surrounding SIJS
across the three chosen States.
A. Maryland
The Maryland court system has four levels.64 There are two trial
58. Knoespel, supra note 30, at 510; see also TVPRA, 8 U.S.C. § 1232 (2008).
59. Knoespel, supra note30, at 510; Emily Rose Gonzalez, Battered Immigrant Youth
Take the Beat: Special Immigrant Juveniles Permitted to Age-Out of Status, 8 SEATTLE J. SOC.
JUST. 409, 410 (2009).
60. Knoespel, supra note 30, at 510.
61. See infra Part II.A.
62. See infra Part II.B.
63. See infra Part II.C.
64. About
the
Maryland
Court
System,
M D.
CTS.,
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court levels: the District Court, with limited jurisdiction over small
claims valued at or below fifteen thousand dollars, and the Circuit
Court, with general jurisdiction.65 The Court of Special Appeals serves
as the intermediate appellate tribunal, and the Court of Appeals serves
as the state’s highest appellate court.66
The Maryland state courts, as discussed below, demonstrate a
willingness to make the findings of fact when presented; however, they
have encountered obstacles arising out of Maryland state family law.
These obstacles have prevented the Circuit Courts from reaching the
merits of the case, instead disposing of the petitions through various
procedural or substantive technicalities.67
i. In re Dany G.
The Court of Special Appeals in In re Dany G.68 clarified what
factors must be considered by Maryland courts when determining (1)
whether a child had been neglected by his or her parents and (2)
whether it was in that child’s best interest to return to his or her country
of origin.69 The Court also discussed how the Maryland appellate
courts viewed the role Maryland courts were to play within the unique
federalism framework created by the SIJS statute.70 Because the
guardianship in this case had already been granted, and thus a finding
of dependency already effectuated, the Court was not confronted with
the various substantive and procedural issues that have prevented
Circuit Courts from reaching the SIJS factors.71
In re Dany G. arose out of the Circuit Court’s denial of the motion
for SIJS findings made by the petitioning guardian.72 Specifically, the
http://www.courts.state.md.us/courts/about.html (last visited May 13, 2017).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See In re Guardianship of Zealand W. and Sophia W., 220 Md. App. 66, 82 (2014)
(holding that, because the biological mother’s parental rights had not been terminated, the
court could not grant guardianship of the juvenile to a third party, thereby preventing a finding
of dependency); see Jose B. v. Maria B., No. 2179, 2016 WL 4261814, at *4 (Md. App. Aug.
8, 2016) (requiring a prospective guardian to overcome the presumption of custody in favor
of the biological parent despite that parent’s consent to the guardianship). But see Simbaina v.
Bunay, 221 Md. App. 440, 452 (2015) (citing Marcelina M.-G. v. Israel S., 112 A.D.3d 100,
109 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013)) (internal quotations omitted) (discussing the respective roles of
the state courts and the federal government in the SIJS process).
68. In re Dany G., 223 Md. App. 707 (2015).
69. Id. at 720-22.
70. Id. at 712-18.
71. See infra Part II.A.ii-iv.
72. In re Dany G., 223 Md. App. at 710.
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Circuit Court held that the minor, over whom the petitioner had already
been granted guardianship by the same court, had not been abused,
abandoned, or neglected by his mother or father.73 The Circuit Court
did not reach the issue of whether or not it was in the juvenile’s best
interest to return to his native country of Guatemala.74 The Court of
Special Appeals vacated and remanded the case back to the Circuit
Court.75 It held that the Circuit Court had applied the wrong legal
standard in considering whether the minor had been neglected by his
parents76 and that the Circuit Court’s failure to determine whether it
was in the minor’s best interest to return to Guatemala was, at least in
part, based on an improper application of Maryland law.77
In making its decision, the Court of Special Appeals interpreted
the SIJS statute to require the application of state law, regardless of
where the abuse, abandonment, or neglect occurred.78 This deviated
from the intermediate appellate courts of New Jersey,79 which have
required that their trial courts apply the “New Jersey state law
definitions but as applied in the context of the child’s home country.”80
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals made its decision on the
grounds that the “federal law directs the states to apply state law, not a
hybrid of the law of a single American state superimposed on the living
conditions of another country.”81 According to the court, this was
because the state judges have expertise in applying their state’s family
law concepts82 and this approach was “more consistent with the
humanitarian purpose of the federal law.”83

73. Id. at 710-12.
74. Id. at 712.
75. Id. at 722.
76. Id. (stating that the Circuit Court had failed to consider whether the child’s welfare
had been harmed or placed at substantial risk of harm).
77. Id. at 720-722.
78. In re Dany G. 223 Md. App. at 717 (“We hold that the trial court must apply state law
definitions of ‘abuse,’ ‘neglect,’ ‘abandonment,’ ‘similar basis under state law,’ and ‘best
interest of the child’ as we would in Maryland, without taking into account where the child
lived at the time the abuse, neglect, or abandonment occurred.”).
79. H.S.P. v. J.K., 435 N.J. Super. 147 (App. Div. 2014); D.C. v. A.B.C., 417 N.J. Super.
41 (Ch. Div. 2010).
80. In re Dany G. 223 Md. App. at 717 (discussing cases cited supra, note 79).
81. In re Dany G. 223 Md. App. at 717-18 (discussing Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 [amended by TVPRA, 8 U.S.C. §
1232 (2008)]).
82. In re Dany G. 223 Md. App. at 718 (quoting In re Y.M., 207 Cal. App. 4th 892, 908
(2012)).
83. In re Dany G. 223 Md. App. at 718 (citing In re Y.M., 207 Cal. App. 4th at 909).
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The Maryland Court of Special Appeals applied the standard of
“neglect” as it is defined by the Maryland Family Law Article84 and
the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.85 Under both articles,
“neglect” is defined in Maryland as “the leaving of a child unattended
or other failure to give proper care and attention to a child by any
parent … under circumstances that indicate that the child’s health or
welfare is harmed or placed at substantial risk of harm.”86 The Court
found that the Circuit Court had only applied the first half of the correct
standard; namely, the Circuit Court had found that the minor was not
neglected because his parents had not physically left him to fend for
himself.87 The Court went on to say that several different facts in the
case would meet the standard of neglect in Maryland.88 Moving on to
the best interest determination, the Court of Special Appeals defined
a child’s best interest as the evaluation of “the child’s life chances …
and [a] predict[ion] with whom the child will be better off in the
future.”89
This case sheds light on the role the Maryland appellate courts
believe the circuit courts should play in the SIJS process. This case
proposes that the circuit courts are not “granting SIJ status [but]
[r]ather [are] making factual findings that the child meets certain
eligibility requirements.”90 Furthermore, the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals stated, “[i]f the underlying juvenile court filing is
properly before the court, state courts are required to make [the SIJS]
factual findings.”91 In this case, the guardianship had already been
granted and the motion for the SIJS factual findings was filed after the
minor had already been deemed a dependent on the court by
establishing guardianship, meaning the court had already adjudicated
84. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-701(s) (West).
85. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-801(s) (West); In re Dany G. 223 Md. App.
at 720.
86. In re Dany G. 223 Md. App. at 720 (citing MD. CODE ANN., Cts. & Jud. Proceedings
§ 3-801; MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-701) (alterations in original).
87. In re Dany G. 223 Md. App. at 720-21.
88. Id. at 721 (“We are also mindful that is parents in Maryland allow or force their child
to leave school at the age of 12, this factor would lead to a finding that the child was
neglected.”).
89. Id. (quoting Montgomery Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 419
(1977)). In a footnote, the Court of Special Appeals stated that it was not itself deciding what
the term “similar basis” included as used in the SIJS statute, but acknowledged that the words
“similar basis” were “added by the TVPRA to allow for the expansion of the protected grounds
beyond those of abuse, neglect, and abandonment.” In re Dany G. 223 Md. App. at 722 n.6
(quoting Pulitzer, supra note 18, at 225).
90. In re Dany G. 223 Md. App. at 714.
91. Id. at 715 (citing Simbaina v. Bunay, 221 Md. App. 440, 455-56 (2015)).
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the juvenile matter and had a duty to rule on the SIJS determinations.92
ii. Jose B. v. Maria B.
Jose B. v. Maria B.93 demonstrates one of the obstacles Maryland
courts have encountered arising out of Maryland family law. The Court
of Special Appeals held that the Circuit Court had correctly refused to
make the SIJS findings because the underlying petition, that of
guardianship, was denied.94
In an unreported opinion, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
affirmed the Circuit Court’s denial of a petition for custody and the
accompanying petition for judicial finding of SIJS facts in regard to
petitioner’s niece, Heidy.95 The crux of the petition was that the
petitioner, as Heidy’s uncle, wanted custody of Heidy because Heidy’s
mother was the subject of deportation proceedings and could be
deported “at any time,” and neither party wanted Heidy to also be
deported.96 The Court of Special Appeals held that “[i]f the court finds
no unfitness on the part of the biological parent or extraordinary
circumstances that make it detrimental for the child to remain in the
parent’s care, the presumption [in favor of custody of the biological
parent] remains, and custody must be awarded to the biological
parent.”97 The Court affirmed the Circuit Court’s denial of the petition
because there was no error or abuse of discretion in finding no
unfitness (nor was any alleged) of Heidy’s mother nor exceptional
circumstances in the “entirely speculative and unlikely”98 deportation
proceedings related to Heidy.99 The Court also held that, “in the
absence of the grant of custody to [petitioner], the court was not
required to make the required findings in relation to Heidy’s eligibility
for SIJ status.”100
This case demonstrates some of the procedural and substantive
92. In re Dany G. 223 Md. App. at 711 (“Charlene M. (‘Charlene’) was appointed
guardian of her cousin, Dany G. (‘Dany’), a native of Guatemala, on November 20, 2013, by
the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.”).
93. Jose B. v. Maria B., No. 2179, 2016 WL 4261814, at *4 (Md. App. Aug. 8, 2016)
94. Id. at *4.
95. Id. at *1.
96. Id. at *2 (“[Jose]’s attorney explained that [Maria] [was] attempting to make
arrangements for her unmarried daughter should [Maria] be deported. Even though [Maria]
has a family, she could be deported at any time”).
97. Id. at *4 (discussing McDermott v. Dougherty, 385 Md. 320, 325 (2005)).
98. Jose B., 2016 WL 4261814, at *2.
99. Id.
100. Id. at *4.
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obstacles SIJS seekers face that are unique to Maryland law. Heidy
was not given the requisite finding of facts, despite the consent of her
mother to the change in custody, solely because of the presumption in
favor of custody of the biological parent that exists in Maryland.101
Additionally, the Court of Special Appeals supported the Circuit
Court’s statement that “the parties cannot sidestep the requirements of
the law simply by indicating consent has been reached”102 and that “[a]
biological parent cannot be permitted to consent to a change in custody
to a third party solely in an attempt to obtain a ‘green card’ for his or
her child, when no other legal factual factors support the change.”103
iii. In re Guardianship of Zealand W.
In re Guardianship of Zealand W.104 set several important
precedents in Maryland appellate advocacy, as well as family law.105
The Court of Special Appeals held that a circuit court could not appoint
a third-party guardian of a minor where at least one of the minor’s
parents was still alive whose parental rights had not been terminated.106
In this case, Zealand’s father was deceased,107 which made
Zealand’s mother the sole natural guardian.108 Because Zealand’s
mother’s parental rights had never been terminated, the Court held that
the Circuit Court had no authority to grant a third party guardianship
over Zealand, either temporary or permanent.109 The Court of Special
Appeals relied heavily on the Maryland Court of Appeals’ decision in
In re Adoption/Guardianship of Tracy K.,110 where the Court of
Appeals held that “[u]ntil [a determination on the termination of
parental rights has been made], ‘[t]he parents [are] the natural
guardians of their minor child’ and are ‘responsible for the child’s

101. Id. at *3 (“In deciding a custody case between a third party and the biological parent
of a child, the presumption is in favor of custody in the biological parent.”) (citing Karen P.
v. Christopher J.B., 163 Md. App. 250, 265 (2005)).
102. Jose B., 2016 WL 4261814, at *4 (internal quotations omitted).
103. Id. at *4.
104. In re Guardianship of Zealand W. and Sophia W., 220 Md. App. 66, 82 (2014)
105. In re Jason Daniel M.-A., No. 0128, 2016 WL 769860, at *3-*6 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
Feb. 29, 2016) (discussing the ramifications of the In re Zealand decision).
106. In re Guardianship of Zealand W., 220 Md. App. at 85-86.
107. Id. at 71.
108. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-203(a) (West); In re Guardianship of Zealand W.,
220 Md. App. at 80.
109. In re Guardianship of Zealand W., 220 Md. App. at 82.
110. In re Adoption/Guardianship of Tracy K., 434 Md. 198 (2013); see In re Zealand W.,
220 Md. App. at 82 (discussing In re Tracy K. and the similarities between the cases).
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support, care, nurture, welfare, and education.’”111 The Court of
Appeals arrived at that conclusion because of the inquiries Title 5 of
the Family Law Article requires courts to make into the best interests
of the child before ruling on the termination of parental rights.112 The
Court of Special Appeals concluded that:
[w]hat was said in Tracy K. is here applicable. Section
13-702(a) of the Estates & Trusts Article does not allow
a circuit court judge to appoint a guardian of the person
of a minor child where, as here: (1) the mother of the
child is still living; and (2) the mother’s rights have
never been terminated in this state pursuant to Title 5 of
the Family Law Article; and (3) parental rights have not
been terminated by any other court.113
The Court of Special Appeals remanded the case back to the
Circuit Court with directions to reconsider the mother’s motion to
dismiss the case.114
In re Guardianship of Zealand W. had the practical effect of
adding a procedural obstacle in the path of a juvenile seeking SIJS
findings in Maryland: that the seeker’s parent(s)’s parental rights must
be terminated prior to any guardianship being granted.115 This is
another example of procedural and substantive barriers unique to
Maryland’s state law that contribute to the lack of uniformity in how
SIJS petitions are dealt with across the nation.
iv. Simbaina v. Bunay
In Simbaina v. Bunay,116 the Court of Special Appeals considered
the refusal of the Circuit Court to make the SIJS factual findings during
an absolute divorce hearing that addressed the custody of Nathaly, the
minor.117 The Court determined that the Circuit Court “should have
heard testimony and evidence relating to Nathaly’s SIJ status” and
“[u]pon remand … should evaluate Nathaly’s request under SIJ
111. In re Tracy K., 434 Md. at 208 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-203(a, b)).
112. In re Tracy K., 434 Md. at 208.
113. In re Guardianship of Zealand W., 220 Md. App. at 82.
114. Id. at 88-89. The Court of Special Appeals confirmed its stance on the matter in a
previous case, holding that, absent the termination of parental rights of living parents, a
guardianship could not be granted. Id.
115. Id. at 85-86.
116. Simbaina v. Bunay, 221 Md. App. 440 (2015).
117. Id. at 445-46.
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standards.”118 The Court also discussed the SIJS framework in detail,
providing insight into the Maryland appellate court’s interpretation of
the procedural constructs of SIJS.119
The Appellant, Maria Simbaina (hereinafter, Simbaina),
responded to her then husband’s Complaint for Custody by filing a
Counter-Complaint for Divorce and Custody.120 During the litigation,
Simbaina requested that the court “enter an Order finding that it is not
in Nathaly’s best interest to return to her home country and
reunification with [Bunay] is not viable due to abuse[,] neglect[,] or
abandonment.”121 The Circuit Court refused to make the requisite SIJS
findings, suggesting that Simbaina needed a “petition for some type of
guardianship” that must “be filed with the court concerning any
immigration issues,” and that no immigration issues would be
discussed because “they were not properly pled.”122 The resulting order
granted the absolute divorce between the parties and addressed
Nathaly’s custody, but did not include any factual findings on
Nathaly’s SIJS eligibility.123 The Circuit Court denied Simbaina’s
Motion to Alter or Amend and her Motion for a New Trial.124 On
appeal, the Court of Special Appeals considered whether “the circuit
court err[ed] when it failed to make Special Immigrant Juvenile factual
findings during the divorce and custody proceedings.”125 The Court
answered in the affirmative and remanded the case to the Circuit Court
to make the requisite factual findings.126
The Court of Special Appeals discussed several key aspects of
SIJS determination, namely: (1) separation of state and federal powers
and concerns regarding state regulation of immigration,127 (2) circuit
court jurisdiction over SIJS,128 and (3) pleading requirements for SIJS
determinations.129 Addressing the separation of powers, the court drew
a distinction between the federal government’s interests in the
immigration status of the juveniles and the circuit court’s power, which
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 458.
Id. at 450-59.
Id. at 446.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Simbaina, 221 Md. App. at 447 (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 448.
Id. at 459.
Simbaina, 221 Md. App. at 450-52.
Id. at 453-57.
Id. 457-58.
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included making “determinations helpful to determining the
immigration status of certain individuals.”130 The Court of Special
Appeals recognized that “[t]he federal government delegated [the
power to make these determinations] to State juvenile courts because
these courts are the appropriate forum for child welfare determinations
regarding abuse, neglect, or abandonment, and a child’s best
interests.”131 The Court of Special Appeals remarked that “it is
important to note that the State court is not rendering an immigration
determination, because the ultimate decisions regarding the child’s
immigration status rests with the federal government,”132 but that state
courts are ultimately responsible for making the underlying findings.133
The Court held that the jurisdiction to make the SIJS findings
“extends to any court that has jurisdiction under state law to make
judicial determinations about the custody and care of juveniles” and
confirmed the circuit courts’ ability to make SIJS findings outside of a
separate guardianship hearing.134 Because the circuit court was
empowered to make determinations regarding the custody of the minor
during the divorce hearing, it was also empowered to make the
requisite SIJS findings as a court having “jurisdiction under state law
to make judicial determinations about the custody and care of
juveniles,” and should therefore have considered evidence regarding
Nathaly’s SIJS eligibility.135 The Court of Special Appeals noted that
there were no restrictions in the federal statute limiting the appropriate
proceedings or procedures through which the SIJS factual findings
were to be made.136 Rather, the sole limitation was that the findings be
made by a “juvenile court,” as defined in the federal regulations.137
The Court of Special Appeals quickly dispatched the pleading
requirement issue by citing Maryland Rule 2-303(b), which requires
only that “pleadings be simple, concise, and direct.”138 The court held
that Simbaina’s amended complaint made clear that “she sought [the
SIJS] additional findings from the court.”139 The court went on to note
130. Id. at 452.
131. Id. at 451 (internal quotations omitted).
132. Id. at 452 (citing Marcelina M.-G. v. Israel S., 112 A.D.3d 100, 109 (N.Y. App. Div.
2013)) (internal quotations omitted).
133. Simbaina, 221 Md. App at 452.
134. Id. at 454 (internal quotations omitted).
135. Id.
136. Simbaina, 221 Md. App. at 455.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 457 (citing Md. Rule 2-303(b)).
139. Simbaina, 221 Md. App. at 457.
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that, “[w]hile a separate motion can be filed […] it is not required by
the federal statute,” but that, “[w]hen pleading [the SIJS] issue before
the circuit court, a moving party should ensure that the court is on
notice of the request for these factual findings.”140 In the instant case,
the Court of Special Appeals held that the pleading was sufficient.141
B. Florida
Similar to the Maryland court system, the Florida court system
consists of four levels: two trial court levels and two appellate court
levels.142 At the trial level, County Courts hear cases involving fifteen
thousand dollars or less and the Circuit Courts hear all other matters.143
The District Courts of Appeal serve as the state’s intermediate
appellate court, with the Florida Supreme Court sitting as the state’s
highest appellate court.144
The Florida appellate courts have expressed concerns with both
their role in the immigration process and the possibility for abuse of
the SIJS process.145 These concerns have manifested themselves in the
definitions and requirements the appellate courts have used and
implemented when considering SIJS petitions.
i. In re S.A.R.D.
In re S.A.R.D.146 demonstrates the Florida appellate court’s
apprehension and concern regarding the state courts’ roles in the SIJS
process. In its opinion, the District Court of Appeals discusses the SIJS
process in detail and describes its issue with inputting best interest
concerns into immigration determinations.147 The Court, discussing the
SIJS factors, found that any abandonment, neglect, or abuse cannot to
be too far removed from the time the petition is filed if the petition is
to succeed, a requirement that is not based on, or found in, the federal
statute.148
In re S.A.R.D. came before the District Court of Appeal of Florida
140. Id. at 458 (internal citations omitted).
141. Id.
142. Florida
State’s
Court
System,
FLORIDA
SUPREME
COURT,
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/pub_info/system2.shtml (last visited May 13, 2017).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See infra Part II.B.i-iii.
146. In re S.A.R.D., 182 So. 3d 897 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
147. Id. at 897-901.
148. See, e.g., Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2006).

14_PRICE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

11/28/17 8:21 AM

SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS

391

on appeal because of the Circuit Court’s denial of S.A.R.D.’s petition,
nine days before his eighteenth birthday, for the required SIJS finding
of dependency under the relevant Florida statute.149 In his petition,
S.A.R.D. alleged that he was abandoned by his father at the age of
seven, over ten years before the filing of his petition, and that he was
neglected by his mother leading up to his departure from his native
country of Honduras in 2014, approximately two years before his
petition.150 The District Court of Appeal began its analysis by
reviewing the history of the SIJS provision of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) and its intended purpose.151 The court discussed
the “bifurcated procedure” for obtaining SIJS, stating that:
Although it is clear that under our federal system the
policies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their rights
to remain here are … entrusted exclusively to Congress,
we are being asked to provide an initial stamp of
approval to a child’s request for SIJ status and
permanent residency as if we are federal customs
agents.152
The Court took issue with the fact that, “because the matter is
before the dependency court, the dependency court must base its
decision, in part, on what is in the best interest of the child, as opposed
to what is in the best interest of the country.”153 The Court discussed
the possible repercussions of using its role to expand SIJS to cover
“children who leave their families and homes in other countries […]
and illegally enter the United States without their parent(s) in search
of a better life.”154 In further support of its contentions, the Court
described the great difficulty of investigating the claims of abuse,
abandonment, and neglect regarding parents living in other
countries.155
The Court first discussed the alleged abandonment by S.A.R.D.’s
father.156 Once again bemoaning the unverifiable nature of the
allegations and the lack of an adversarial proceeding,157 the Court
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

In re S.A.R.D., 182 So. 3d at 899.
Id.
Id. at 899-901.
Id. at 900 (citing In re K.B.K.V., 176 So. 3d 297 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)).
Id. at 900-01.
Id. at 901.
In re S.A.R.D., 182 So. 3d at 901.
Id. at 902.
Id. (“As already noted above, however, S.A.R.D.’s petition was not subjected to an
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discussed five factors158 proposed by the Fourth District Court of
Appeal for consideration in private dependency petitions.159 The
District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that the
father’s abandonment over ten years prior to the filing of the petition
was too far removed to merit a dependency finding.160 The District
Court of Appeal stated that it was clear that “S.A.R.D., for the
[remaining] nine-day period of his minority status, was not in
substantial risk of abuse, neglect, or abandonment.”161 In discussing the
alleged neglect by S.A.R.D.’s mother, the court noted that, under
Florida statutory law, a guardian of a child cannot be found to have
neglected the child if the neglect was caused “primarily by financial
inability [to care for the child] unless actual services for relief have
been offered to and rejected by such person.”162 The Court found there
was no evidence that S.A.R.D.’s mother was financially able to meet
S.A.R.D.’s needs and that “the family’s poverty, without more, does
not constitute neglect as contemplated by our dependency statutes.”163
In this case, the Court read into the SIJS statute a proximity
requirement to the determination of whether or not a juvenile had been
abused, neglected, or abandoned.164
ii. In re F.J.G.M.
In re F.J.G.M.165 confirmed the Florida appellate courts’ position
regarding the temporal proximity of the abandonment, abuse, or
neglect and an SIJS petition. The Court held that the abandonment
alleged by the petitioner was too far removed in time to provide a basis
for an SIJS finding.166 This holding instituted a new obstacle to
achieving SIJS: that the abandonment, neglect, or abuse be either
sufficiently close in time to the relevant petition or that it be imminent.
adversarial proceeding.”).
158. (1) The nature, severity and frequency of the abuse, neglect, or abandonment; (2) the
time that has elapsed between the abuse, neglect or abandonment and the filing of the petition;
(3) whether the child is presently at a continued, but not necessarily imminent, risk of harm
before turning eighteen years old; (4) the availability of a caregiver capable of providing both
supervision and care; and (5) any other relevant factors unique to the particular case. Id.
159. Id. at 902 (citing O.I.C.L. v. Dep’t of Children and Families,169 So. 3d 1244, 1249
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)).
160. In re S.A.R.D., 182 So. 3d at 903.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 903-04 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.01(30) (defining “harm” as it relates to neglect
of the child) and FLA. STAT. § 39.01(44) (defining “neglect”)).
163. In re S.A.R.D., 182 So. 3d at 905.
164. Id. at 903.
165. In re F.J.G.M., 196 So. 3d 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
166. Id. at 539
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This opinion also brought to light several of the primary issues that the
Florida bench saw in its role in the SIJS process, including its own
policy considerations and views on immigration.167
In re F.J.G.M. arose out of F.J.G.M.’s mother’s petition for
F.J.G.M. to be declared dependent on the Florida Court in order to
become eligible for SIJS.168 The petition alleged that F.J.G.M. had been
abandoned at birth by his father,169 which qualified him as a dependent
under Florida law.170
The Third District Court of Appeals characterized the mother’s
petition as “an attempt to expand the stated purpose of the [SIJS
statute],”171 as well as encouraging illegal immigration and placing a
“very difficult burden upon the state courts tasked with reviewing these
private
dependency
petitions
and
making
dependency
determinations.”172 The District Court of Appeals discussed the alleged
abandonment by F.J.G.M.’s father at birth as it related to the Florida
Statutes173 and found: (1) the abandonment, over thirteen years before
the dependency proceeding, was too far removed to support a finding
of dependency and (2) F.J.G.M. was “not at a substantial risk of
imminent abuse, abandonment or neglect when his mother filed the
petition [since he was] living with and being cared for by his mother
in Miami.”174 Based on those findings, the District Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court’s denial of the petition on the basis that the
abandonment by the minor’s father was too far removed to be
considered in an SIJS adjudication.175
The Court focused on the alleged purpose of the SIJS in avoiding
the deportation of the minor with or to the abusive, neglectful, or
abandoning parent(s).176 This approach ignored the discussion of the
best interests of the child, instead focusing on procedure and a narrow,
167. Id. at 538.
168. Id. at 536.
169. While no father was listed on the birth certificate or during several other proceedings,
including the mother’s application for public assistance, Alexis Escobar, the suspected father,
acknowledged paternity during the dependency proceedings. Id. at 536-37.
170. Id. at 538-39 (defining dependent child under FLA. STAT § 39.01(15) as “one who has
been abandoned, abused, or neglected by the child’s parent or parents or legal guardians”).
171. In re F.J.G.M., 196 So. 3d at 538.
172. Id. at 538 (citing In re S.A.R.D., 182 So. 3d 897, 901 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)).
173. In re F.J.G.M., 196 So. 3d at 538-539.
174. Id. at 539.
175. Id. at 540.
176. Id. at 538.
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relatively unsupported reading of the SIJS statute’s intent. This opinion
also alluded to the fact that Florida courts are faced with a large number
of petitions for dependency aimed at qualifying the minor beneficiary
for SIJS.177 There was concern from the Court that extending
dependency findings to juveniles who were not in danger of being
neglected, abused, or abandoned would “encourage illegal
immigration.”178
iii. O.I.C.L. v. Department of Children and Families
Florida courts, as discussed above, have demonstrated a dislike
for the burden placed on them by the SIJS procedure. This dislike has
manifested in decisions based on narrow or novel readings of the
requirements of SIJS.179 The Florida courts have justified their
positions by citing policy concerns regarding the nation’s immigration
policies and have attempted to curtail the number of successful SIJS
petitions, acting more as a gatekeeper than as a fact finder determining
what is in the juvenile’s best interest.180 O.I.C.L. v. Department of
Children and Families181 was another case requiring a close proximity
in time between the alleged abuse, abandonment, or neglect and the
petition for SIJS findings. The Court in O.I.C.L. held that, in order for
abuse, abandonment, or neglect to provide the basis for SIJS finding
of facts, it must have occurred close in time to the petition or be
imminent.182
O.I.C.L. v. Department of Children and Families was before the
District Court of Appeal on appeal by O.I.C.L. because of the denial
of his petition for dependency, in which he argued he had been
abandoned by his parents and had no parent or legal custodians capable
of providing supervision and care.183 In his petition, O.I.C.L. alleged
that he had been abandoned by his father and neglected by his mother
since the age of twelve, over six years prior to the filing of the petition
177. Id. at 538 (“[these many petitions place] a very difficult burden upon the state courts
tasked with reviewing these private dependency petitions.”).
178. In re F.J.G.M., 196 So. 3d at 538.
179. Id. at 540 (holding that the abandonment of petitioner by his father 13 years prior to
the petition was too far removed to be considered).
180. Id. at 538 (“The purpose of the [SIJS] Act is not to provide exemption from
deportation to children who forgo legal immigration migration to the United States and
illegally enter the United States in search of a better life or to be reunited with a family member
who came to the United States legally or illegally.”).
181. O.I.C.L. v. Dep’t of Children and Families, 169 So. 3d 1244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2015).
182. Id. at 1248.
183. Id. at 1246.
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at issue.184 The allegations of neglect centered on O.I.C.L.’s mother’s
inability to provide sufficient food, water, and clothing for O.I.C.L.185
The trial court denied the petition, finding that O.I.C.L. was living with
an uncle who fit the definition of “caregiver” under the Florida
Statutes186 and who had, therefore, become a “relative caregiver”
legally responsible for O.I.C.L.’s welfare.187 In affirming the trial
court’s ruling, the appellate court considered: (1) “whether a
dependency adjudication can be based on alleged abuse or neglect
occurring at any time, even if remote to the petition’s filing,”188 and (2)
whether a child living in conditions of poverty was on its own
sufficient to sustain a finding of abandonment or neglect.189
The District Court of Appeals held that not considering the length
of time between the adjudication and the alleged abuse or neglect
would lead to the absurd result of permitting “the adjudication of a
seventeen-year-old based upon an isolated incident of ‘abuse’ inflicted
at the age of two by a long since deceased parent.”190 The court held
that finding a child dependent under those circumstances would permit
the irrational result of allowing “the adjudication of any child ever
subjected to abuse, abandonment, or neglect by a parent at any point
during their minority.”191
The District Court of Appeals also engaged in an analysis of the
statutory definitions of “abandoning a child,”192 “neglect,”193 and
“neglecting a child,”194 and found that, absent a willful refusal of
available resources, the inability to provide for a child as a result of
poverty did not constitute neglect or abandonment.195 The Court
observed that:
Judicial resources too often are being misused to obtain
dependency orders for minors who are neither abused,
neglected or abandoned, and who seek a dependency
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.
Id.
FLA. STAT. § 39.01(10).; FLA. STAT.§ 39.01(47).
O.I.C.L., 169 So. 3d at 1247.
Id. at 1248.
Id.
Id. (citing Holly v, Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984)).
O.I.C.L., 169 So. 3d at 1248.
FLA. STAT.§ 39.01(1).
FLA. STAT. § 39.01(44).
FLA. STAT.§ 39.01(30).
O.I.C.L., 169 So. 3d at 1249.
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adjudication and best-interest order not because they
are endangered and need protection but because they
want preferential immigration treatment without having
to comply with the requirements of the customary legal
immigration process.196
The Court noted, however, that the motivations behind a child’s
petition for dependency should not factor into the court’s decision,
although the motivations seem to have indeed been a factor the Court
considered in determining the relevance of the difference in time
between the alleged abuse or neglect and the petition in this case.197
C. California
California has organized its court in three levels: two appellate
levels and one trial level.198 There is one trial court, a Superior Court,
in each county.199 The District Courts of Appeal serve as the
intermediate appellate courts, with the Supreme Court sitting as the
state’s highest court.200
The California Courts have embraced their roles as initial fact
finders and have set, as their purpose, determining what is in the best
interest of the child, provided that certain baseline criteria are met.
California courts have consistently made SIJS findings when
requested, making the granting of SIJS petitions the rule rather than
the exception.201
i. Leslie H. v. Superior Court
Leslie H. v. Superior Court202 arose out of the Superior Court’s
refusal to make SIJS findings during a delinquency adjudication for
Leslie H.203 Leslie had been arrested for, and had plead guilty to,
stealing alcoholic beverages and cigars from a liquor store, as well as
assaulting the clerk when he confronted her and her friends.204 During
196. Id. at 1250.
197. Id. at 1249.
198. Courts, California Courts, http://www.courts.ca.gov/courts.htm (last visited May 13,
2017).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. E.g., In re Israel. O., 233 Cal. App. 4th 279 (2015); see also Eddie E. v. Superior
Court, 234 Cal. App. 4th 319 (2015).
202. Leslie H. v. Superior Court, 224 Cal. App. 4th 340 (2014).
203. Id. at 343-44.
204. Id. at 345.
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the delinquency proceedings, Leslie moved for the court to make the
SIJS findings on the grounds that she had been abandoned by her father
and abused by her mother.205 The trial court expressed concern that, if
it were to grant SIJS findings to juveniles who had been arrested and
convicted and/or plead guilty to a crime, it would incentivize illegal
immigrants to break the law to become dependent on a juvenile
court.206
The Court of Appeal looked at the plain language of the SIJS
statute as it had been amended in 2008207 and held that, although the
Superior Court had considered the proper criteria,208 it had declined to
make the appropriate SIJS findings out of “misplaced policy
considerations . . . despite ample, uncontroverted evidence supporting
the [SIJS] findings.”209 The Court of Appeal defined the juvenile
court’s role in the SIJS process as “not to determine worthy candidates
for citizenship, but simply to identify abused, neglected, or abandoned
alien children under its jurisdiction who cannot reunify with a parent
or be safely returned in their best interests to their home country.”210
The California appellate courts have unwaveringly stood behind this
principle and, as such, have routinely found that the Superior courts
should reach the merits of SIJS petitions, the overwhelming majority
of which are granted.211 California courts have been consistent in their
application of SIJS requirements and procedures and, thus need not be
discussed further.
PART III. PROBLEMS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
As evidenced by the cases discussed above, there is a vast array
of policies, procedures, and proceedings state courts across the country
205. Id.
206. Id. at 346.
207. Leslie H., 224 Cal. App. 4th at 349-50.
208. The court considered (1) whether Leslie H. was in fact dependent upon the court
within the meaning of the SIJS statute, (2) whether returning to her parents was a viable option,
and (3) whether repatriation was in Leslie H.’s best interest. Id. at 344. The court found that
Leslie H.’s delinquency was controlling as to factors two and three and did not make any
findings of fact in their regard. Id.
209. Id. at 350.
210. Id. at 351.
211. E.g., B.F. v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. App. 4th 621 (2012) (holding that the probate
court was authorized to make the SIJS findings); see also In re Israel O., 233 Cal. App. 4th
279 (2015) (holding that, despite suitable parental home, a minor may establish reunification
with other parent as not viable so as to satisfy SIJS requirements); Eddie E. v. Superior Court,
234 Cal. App. 4th 319 (2015) (holding that the petitioner’s mother’s death did not cause
reunification with the mother to cease being not viable due to abandonment).
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have implemented to deal with their fact-finding duties under the SIJS
provision. Several states have developed serious problems in their
adjudication of SIJS petitions through erroneous interpretation of the
proper role of the state court in the SIJS process or misinterpretation
of the federal statute or the regulations governing its application.212
These problems result in new hurdles that SIJS seekers are forced to
overcome before they are able to submit their application to the
USCIS. While it is true that this “delegation of duties” between the
state and federal systems alleviates the burden on the federal courts
and immigration agencies, it has resulted, and will continue to result,
in inconsistent outcomes based on the various state approaches.
The lack of uniformity in how the various states treat and
adjudicate SIJS petitions is a significant problem. Currently, two
juveniles could have the exact same set of circumstances surrounding
their petitions, but the outcome could be different based solely on the
state in which their petition is brought, where one juvenile’s
application for citizenship could be denied while the other is granted.
Uniformity across the states is important because it promotes equity,
as well as the “best interest of the child” approach endorsed by the
CRC.213
The unique mixture of state and federal power in SIJS procedures
is one of the primary problems that have caused the lack of uniformity.
As demonstrated in Florida, some state courts have struggled with their
perceived role in what they perceive as a decision regarding
immigration.214 This creates a lack of uniformity when, absent the
requisite findings of fact at the state level, a petitioner for SIJS is
precluded from submitting the petition to INS for consideration.215
Thus, a petitioner submitting his or her petition in Florida is less likely
to get the requisite findings of fact, or at the very least have his or her
petition subjected to heightened scrutiny in the name of public policy,
than would a petitioner in Maryland submitting an identical petition.216
212. See supra Part II.A-B.
213. Pulitzer, supra note 18, at 208-09.
214. E.g., In re F.J.G.M., 196 So.3d 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016); see also In re
S.A.R.D.,182 So. 3d 897, 900-01 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
215. Pulitzer, supra note 18, at 214 (discussing procedure for submitting petition to INS
once the requisite finding of facts are made).
216. Compare In re S.A.R.D., 182 So. 3d 897, 900 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (stating that
“although it is clear that under our federal system the policies pertaining to the entry of aliens
and their rights to remain here are … entrusted exclusively to Congress, we are being asked to
provide an initial stamp of approval to a child’s request for SIJ status and permanent residency
as if we are federal customs agents”) with Simbaina v. Bunay, 221 Md. App. 440, 451 (2015)
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What follows are proposed solutions to identified problems, and
suggestions that could help curb the development of additional
problems in the future.
A. Problems
i. Varying Requirements Under State Statutory Law
In re Guardianship of Zealand W. had the practical effect of
adding a procedural obstacle in the path of a juvenile seeking SIJS
findings in Maryland that is not found in other states.217 As a result of
the Court’s ruling in Zealand, in order for a third party to be given
guardianship over a minor, thereby enabling the court to make the
requisite SIJS findings, the parental rights of all surviving parents must
have been previously severed or severed during the guardianship
proceedings.218 This represented a shift in Maryland family law
adjudication that could have disastrous effects on SIJS seekers. While
this case did not deal with SIJS factors directly, it dealt with one of the
primary methods by which SIJS seekers are able to get into juvenile or
family courts: guardianship petitions. Under this ruling, petitioners
seeking SIJS findings through a petition for guardianship by a relative
or other qualified individual would be required to first seek, obtain, or
otherwise demonstrate the termination of the petitioner’s parents’
parental rights.219
This decision seemed to hinge on a technicality. There was
substantial evidence that it was not in Zealand’s best interest to be
placed with his mother, since custody had been awarded to his father
during the divorce and his mother had only been allowed supervised
visits.220 The Court failed to address the substantive issues and instead
focused its attention on whether or not the Maryland Estates and Trusts
Article allowed a circuit court to grant a third party guardianship of a
minor when that minor’s parent was still alive, his or her parental rights
(stating that “[t]he federal government delegated [the power to make these determinations] to
State juvenile courts because these courts are the appropriate forum for child welfare
determinations regarding abuse, neglect, or abandonment, and a child’s best interests”).
217. Compare In re Guardianship of Zealand W., 220 Md. App. at 86 (requiring a SIJS
seeker’s parent(s)’s rights be terminated prior to a guardianship being established under
Maryland law) with In re F.G.J.M., 196 So. 3d 534, 536 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (deciding
on a case where the minor’s mother petitioned the Florida court for a finding of dependency
based on abandonment by the minor’s father).
218. In re Guardianship of Zealand W., 220 Md. App. at 86.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 71-72 (discussing the marriage between Zealand’s parents, the divorce, and the
mother’s “history of serious alcohol abuse”).
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had not been terminated, and no testamentary appointment had been
made.221 Of notable concern is that the Maryland Estates and Trusts
Article does incorporate the best interests of the child in its
adjudication, which is inapposite to the intent behind SIJS findings
being made by state juvenile courts.222 This put a new requirement on
those seeking SIJS in Maryland: that the court terminate the parental
rights of the SIJS seeker before awarding guardianship. This could
dissuade youth from seeking SIJS, since many are fleeing poverty and
danger-ridden homelands where their parents were unable to provide
for them, not out of a lack of affection or devotion, but simply out of a
lack of financial means. This would have the practical effect of
denying SIJS to many deserving youth.
Another source of variance amongst the states is the different
cutoff ages for juvenile determinations. Under Florida law, a child, for
purposes of dependency proceedings, is “any unmarried individual
under the age of 18 years.”223 Under Maryland law, a child is “an
unmarried individual under the age of 21 years.”224 This is one of the
starkest differences between the states and is a clear example of why
change is necessary. A nineteen-year-old youth in Florida would be
precluded from even filing a request for SIJS findings since he or she
could not be found dependent on a Florida court because of his or her
age.225 This irreconcilable difference requires some sort of solution to
provide consistency.
ii. State Court Interpretation of Federal Law
In O.I.C.L. v. Department of Children and Families,226 Florida
began requiring that the abuse, neglect, or abandonment not only have
transpired,227 but that it is not “too far removed” from the petition such
221. Id. at 85-86.
222. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-702; see also Simbaina v. Bunay, 221 Md.
App. 440, 451 (2015) (stating that “[t]he federal government delegated [the power to make
these determinations] to State juvenile courts because these courts are the appropriate forum
for child welfare determinations regarding abuse, neglect, or abandonment, and a child’s best
interests”).
223. FLA. STAT.§ 39.01(12).
224. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 1-201(a).
225. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2006)
(requiring that the juvenile be declared dependent on a juvenile court); see also FLA. STAT. §
39.01(12) (defining child or youth as “any unmarried individual under the age of 18 years”).
226. O.I.C.L. v. Dep’t of Children and Families, 169 So. 3d 1244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2015).
227. The Florida courts have expressed a need for trial courts to “use the most caution to
avoid being nothing more than a “‘rubber-stamp,’” and to carefully consider all evidence and
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that the minor is not in continued danger of harm.228 This case was one
of many in Florida to demonstrate the courts’ frustration with the
frequency and quantity of dependency petitions based on a desire for
SIJS findings.229 The Court was more interested in ferreting out the
meritless or contrived requests for SIJS findings than determining the
best interests of the child. The Court acted as a gatekeeper charged
with granting or denying entry to the SIJS seeker, rather than a fact
finder whose statutory duty was to make a specific factual finding
regarding the history and characteristics of the SIJS seeker. The
Florida court reached its conclusion out of misplaced policy concerns
regarding federal immigration policy and congressional intent
regarding the SIJS statute, as well as an admitted confusion as to the
nature of its role in the SIJS framework.230 Florida is not the only state
to face this dilemma, as many states, including Maryland, Minnesota,
and New York, have grappled with the complex federalism framework
that enshrouds the SIJS provision.231 The complexity has given several
courts pause and has caused a reluctance to reach the merits in favor
of extension of state law or interpretation of federal law that disposes
of the case.232
B. Solutions
i. Promulgating Federal Regulations
One solution to procedural blocks and lack of uniformity amongst
the states is the promulgation of federal regulations detailing
appropriate proceedings and procedures for making the SIJS findings
consistent across jurisdictions. Detailing appropriate procedures and
definitions would help state courts that have struggled with the
question of their ability to reach the SIJS findings during state court
not decide these dependency case “for sake of expediency or sympathy.” Id. at 1250.
228. Id. at 1249.
229. Id. at 1251 (Forst, J., dissenting); see also In re F.J.G.M., 196 So. 3d 534, 538 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2016); In re S.A.R.D.,182 So. 3d 897, 901 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
230. In re S.A.R.D., 182 So. 3d at 900-01.
231. See Simbaina v. Bunay, 221 Md. App. 440, 445-48 (2015) (discussing where the trial
court had refused to make the SIJS findings because the petition was made during a proceeding
for absolute divorce and custody); see also In re Welfare of A.S., 882 N.W.2d 633, 639 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2016) (holding that placement of the juvenile on probation for a traffic offense did
not constitute “dependency” on a state court or custody of a state agency as required for SIJS);
In re Jose H., 40 N.Y.S.3d 710, 716 (2016) (holding that the petitioner had not been declared
dependent on a juvenile court, but rather had been committed to state prison for committing a
crime for which he was charged as an adult).
232. See supra, note 231 and accompanying text.
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proceedings.233 Additionally, because of the SIJS’ unique joinder of
both state and federal authority, uniformity on the state level, once
achieved, would match uniformity on the federal level, where a single
body, INS, is charged with rendering a decision regardless of the state
in which the factual findings are made.234
Federal regulations defining key statutory terms would also
promote uniformity. For instance, defining what constitutes neglect,
abuse, or abandonment for purposes of SIJS, instead of relying on law
that varies by state, could help state courts reach uniform decisions
regarding a child’s appropriate designation. This would help avoid the
institution of obstacles such as those that arose in Florida over the
requirement that the abuse, neglect, or abandonment not be “too far
removed” from the petition,235 in addition to the different standards of
neglect across the states.236 The promulgation of federal regulations
would help ensure uniformity across the states without drastically
changing the way SIJS petitions are brought or the manner in which
they are adjudicated.
ii. Creating a New SIJS Proceeding in State Courts
Another solution is to create a stand-alone SIJS proceeding that
would make the juvenile dependent on the state court for the findings
of fact without requiring an underlying cause of action that would put
SIJS seekers before a state juvenile court. In such a case, an SIJS seeker
would file a stand-alone petition for SIJS findings of fact in an
appropriate court. This would eliminate the issue that has arisen in
Maryland where, in order to place a child under the guardianship of a
third party, thereby rendering the child dependent on the court, courts
are now mandating the termination of the surviving parent(s)’ paternal
rights .237 This would also put the court on notice of the request for the
233. Simbaina, 221 Md. App. at 445-46 (discussing where the Circuit Court had refused
to reach the merits of the SIJS petition when made during a divorce proceeding).
234. Jessica R. Pulitzer, Note, Fear and Failing in Family Court: Special Immigrant
Juvenile Status and the State Court Problem, 21 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 201, 214 (2014).
235. In re F.J.G.M., 196 So. 3d 534, 540 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (holding that
abandonment of the minor by his father over 13 years prior to the petition was “too far
removed” to permit a finding of abandonment); see also In re S.A.R.D.,182 So. 3d 897, 90405 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (holding that mere failure to provide for the child’s needs is
insufficient to constitute neglect).
236. Compare In re S.A.R.D.,182 So. 3d at 904-05 (holding that mere failure to provide
for the child’s needs is insufficient to constitute neglect) with In re Dany G. 223 Md. App.
707, 721 (2015) (stating that in Maryland allowing a minor to drop out of school constitutes
negligence).
237. In re Guardianship of Zealand W., 220 Md. App. 66, 85-86 (2014).
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SIJS findings, since it would be its own separate proceeding, thereby
avoiding the problems posed in Simbaina v. Bunay, where the circuit
court failed to address the SIJS request because it believed SIJS
findings required the filing of particular pleadings.238 This would also
make these adjudications more procedurally consistent, eliminating the
disparity between states that do not grant dependency beyond the age
of eighteen239 and those that allow individuals under the age of twentyone 240 to become dependent on the court.
Creating a separate state level cause of action would enable courts
in more cases to reach the truly important issue, and the reason they
are part of the process, of the best interests of the child. By removing
the procedural requirement of a valid underlying state law cause of
action, otherwise meritorious petitions would cease to be dismissed or
denied based solely on the lack of dependency on the court, and would
be able to proceed on the merits.
This result could also be reached by amending the SIJS statute to
no longer require a finding of dependency. Such an amendment would
allow SIJS seekers to request the SIJS findings as declaratory relief
separate from any underlying state law causes of action under the state
court’s general jurisdiction as a court of equity. This amendment
would help reduce frequency of the unfortunate occurrence where the
approval or denial of a petition hinges on the state of the law regarding
custody determinations of the state in which it is brought, rather than
on the facts or merits of the case.241
iii. Creating a Federal Court Division to Handle SIJS Petitions
A more drastic and unprecedented approach would be to create
an SIJS division in the federal district courts and grant them
jurisdiction over SIJS petitions. This would assist with creating a
uniform procedural framework, with federal district courts applying
federal procedural law, although it would not tackle the inconsistencies
inherent in state law when considering whether or not a minor has been
abused, abandoned, or neglected, since the district courts would

238. Simbaina, 221 Md. App. at 458.
239. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(12) (defining a child as “any unmarried person under the age of
18 years”).
240. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 1-201(a) (defining child as “an unmarried individual
under the age of 21 years”).
241. Compare In re Dany G., 223 Md. App. 707 (2015) with O.I.C.L. v. Dep’t of Children
and Families, 169 So. 3d 1244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
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continue applying state substantive law.
This solution would be most effective if coupled with the
proposed promulgation of federal regulations defining the key
statutory terms, such as “neglect,” “abandonment,” and “abuse.” In
this scenario, Congress could continue to benefit from family and
juvenile court judges’ expertise, since those who are nominated would
ostensibly be nominated from those very courts. The judges assigned
to this division could be required to have experience adjudicating
juvenile matters at the state level.242 While this would initially
constitute a tremendous shift from allowing all juvenile and family
matters to remain at the state level, it could be done under the auspices
of retaining all things related to immigration at the federal level.
iv. The Best Solution: Federal Question in Federal Court
Ultimately, the most effective solution would be the creation of a
SIJS division in the federal district courts, as well as a statutory
amendment creating a federal cause of action for SIJS seekers. First, it
guarantees the uniformity of procedure, since federal courts are bound
to follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, regardless of the nature
of their jurisdiction.243 Second, the amendment of the SIJS statute
giving the power to make SIJS determinations to a federal court would
necessarily confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the federal district
courts under the doctrine of federal question jurisdiction, since any
proceeding requesting the SIJS findings would stem from the INA.
Since the inception of SIJS, Congress has amended its requirements
twice, making a third amendment conceivable. Therefore, this solution
becomes easily obtainable.
Third, the creation of such a division could carry with it the
requirement that judges assigned or nominated to the courts be
approved by the state court and/or division tasked with hearing
juvenile matters. Such a requirement would preserve the benefit of the
expertise of the state bench dealing with juvenile concerns. Lastly, and
potentially most importantly, this would remove the federalism issue
242. This should be a requirement, as the primary reason for the delegation of the fact
finding to the state courts was to benefit from the state judiciaries’ experience regarding
juvenile determinations. See Simbaina v. Bunay, 221 Md. App. 440, 451 (2015) (stating that
“[t]he federal government delegated [the power to make these determinations] to State juvenile
courts because these courts are the appropriate forum for child welfare determinations
regarding abuse, neglect, or abandonment, and a child’s best interests”).
243. See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 1 (stating that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “govern
the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts”).
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currently posed by SIJS and the corresponding dilemmas with which
state courts have struggled.244 The assignment of SIJS proceedings to
the federal courts would keep all immigration matters at the federal
level, relieving the difficult balancing act from the state courts. The
amendment would also solve the issue surrounding the lack of
uniformity regarding what constitutes a declaration of the juvenile as
dependent on a juvenile court. Such a requirement would have been
foregone to create the stand-alone federal cause of action, as the
petitioner would necessarily be dependent on the federal court for the
adjudication of his or her petition.
The financial costs involved in creating such a department would
be minimal. The department would be part of the federal district court
system and could be limited to one judge per state, although more
could be nominated as needed for states or districts with heavier SIJS
caseloads. Additionally, for those states and/or districts with a limited
caseload, a separate department would not be necessary. Instead, these
new federal SIJS petitions would be added to the federal docket of the
appropriate district court. Alternatively, those states and/or districts
with limited caseloads could be consolidated into one SIJS division.
This would maintain the ability of the division to select a judge with
juvenile experience.
Politically, this solution should be very uncontroversial, in part
due to the noncontroversial nature of statutory amendments, a frequent
occurrence at all levels of government. In larger part, however, such
an amendment would remove the hazardous question of federalism
from the state judiciaries, thereby removing the need for state judges
to ponder their role in the immigration system. Given the dislike some
state courts have expressed at their current role in the SIJS process, it
is likely that many state judiciaries would greet news of such an
amendment with relief. At the very least, such an amendment would
be a welcome sight in the Florida courts.
CONCLUSION
The creation of SIJS was a step in the right direction for the
244. In re S.A.R.D., 182 So. 3d 897, 900 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (discussing at length,
and noting its disapproval of, the complexity of the federalism dynamic posed by SIJS, and
stating that “although it is clear that under our federal system the policies pertaining to the
entry of aliens and their rights to remain here are … entrusted exclusively to Congress, we are
being asked to provide an initial stamp of approval to a child’s request for SIJ status and
permanent residency as if we are federal customs agents”).
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United States towards protecting an incredibly vulnerable segment of
the population, but much work needs to be done for it to truly achieve
such an objective. Although SIJS relief is obtainable, inconsistencies
between states/jurisdictions and the novel and complex nature of the
relationship between state and federal law SIJS creates have become
obstacles to those seeking the relief to which they are entitled. This has
resulted in the denial of petitions and requests for SIJS findings in one
jurisdiction that would likely have been granted in another, making the
determination of SIJS more dependent on the jurisdiction the juvenile
lives in than on the juvenile’s past or future. Drastic measures are
needed to give the SIJS provision of the INA the “teeth” it needs to
accomplish its lofty and inspirational goal of assisting those in most
need of protection, the world’s youth, regardless of which state they
call home.

